Abstract In this paper I use philosophical accounts on the relationship between trust and knowledge in science to apprehend this relationship on the Web. I argue that trust and knowledge are fundamentally entangled in our epistemic practices. Yet despite this fundamental entanglement, we do not trust blindly. Instead we make use of knowledge to rationally place or withdraw trust. We use knowledge about the sources of epistemic content as well as general background knowledge to assess epistemic claims. Hence, although we may have a default to trust, we remain and should remain epistemically vigilant; we look out and need to look out for signs of insincerity and dishonesty in our attempts to know. A fundamental requirement for such vigilance is transparency: in order to critically assess epistemic agents, content and processes, we need to be able to access and address them. On the Web, this request for transparency becomes particularly pressing if (a) trust is placed in unknown human epistemic agents and (b) if it is placed in non-human agents, such as algorithms. I give examples of the entanglement between knowledge and trust on the Web and draw conclusions about the forms of transparency needed in such systems to support epistemically vigilant behaviour, which empowers users to become responsible and accountable knowers.
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Keywords Knowledge Á Recommender systems Á Trust Á Wikipedia Á Web Á Algorithmic authority Á Epistemic practices Á Socio-technical epistemic systems ''A well-known scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public lecture on astronomy. He described how the earth orbits around the sun and how the sun, in turn, orbits around the center of a vast collection of stars called our galaxy. At the end of the lecture, a little old lady at the back of the room got up and said: ''What you have told us is rubbish. The world is really a flat plate supported on the back of a giant tortoise.'' The scientist gave a superior smile before replying, ''What is the tortoise standing on?'' ''You're very clever, young man, very clever,'' said the old lady. ''But it's turtles all the way down!'' (Hawking 1998: 1) Trusting to know on the Web: a self-observation
In the process of writing this paper I checked the blog of one of the researchers 1 whose work is portrayed below and came across a link to a to a blog entry by Clay Shirky on algorithmic authority (Shirky 2009 ). In this post, there is a reference to the anecdote of the turtles quoted above, which seemed to be a perfect metaphor for the entanglement of knowledge and trust that I wanted to argue for. When reading it, I wanted to know whether it really was Bertrand Russell who stars in this anecdote. I typed ''turtles all the way down Russell'' into Google. From the first 50 hits, 21 had exactly the same string of words, namely: ''A wellknown scientist (some say it was Bertrand Russell) once gave a public lecture''. My suspicion was that this may well be a legend, fueled by the sheer repetition of exactly
Introduction
This brief description of my own epistemic process involved in writing this paper allows addressing some of its main topics. First, it serves as a good example for a typical epistemic situation: I searched a reference for a claim, looked for its verification, filtered an abundance of epistemic content. This epistemic situation was further characterized by an absence of direct evidence: Since I had not witnessed the whipsmart dialogue, I had to rely on testimonial evidence to assess the likelihood of this incident.
Second, I employed various Web resources. I accepted certain content and double-checked other. I used search engines, blogs as well as personal, institutional and commercial websites. I trusted to know-and used knowledge to rationally place my trust. Thus, I assessed the trustworthiness of different sources of epistemic content. Is the Wikipedia article more trustworthy than a short introductory anecdote of a well-known scientist? Are there other, independent sources that support Hawkings ascription to Russell? Does the search engine withhold relevant information on this question? I did not trust blindly: I made judgments about the reliability of different sources of epistemic content and used various proxies for this assessment. Moreover, the amount of scrutiny, my epistemic vigilance depended on my judgment on what was at stakes. If I had only wanted to tell this anecdote at a party, I may have directly accepted the claim from the Wikipedia website. If I had intended to write a paper on Russell, I probably would have invested much more time to verify the claim.
Third, this example shows that knowledge and trust are fundamentally entangled. Since direct, testimony-free verification of the claim is impossible, my research for further support of the claim is in principle open-ended. At a certain point, I have to stop searching for further confirmation and start trusting. More generally speaking, trust comes into play because of the limitation of research resources, capabilities or time, i.e. often, the absence of evidence in epistemic situation is not a general problem, but due to time restrictions etc. In such cases, we have to trust in order to know.
Finally, the example of my research indicates not only how research and the Web are entangled today, but also how isomorphic they are. Whether one imagines this research taking place for scientific purposes or for everyday information acquisition makes no difference in principle: In both cases, epistemic agents, embedded in a sociotechnical system, are engaged in epistemic practices.
In the following, I want to deepen this reflection on the relationship between knowledge and trust on the Web. I focus on two different examples of socio-technical systems on the Web, which are used for epistemic purposes: Wikipedia and Recommender Systems. By comparing epistemic practices on the Web with those in science, I show that in both cases knowledge and trust are inherently entangled in our attempts to know. I conclude that acknowledging this fundamental entanglement requires an epistemological as much as an ethical analysis of epistemic practices on the Web.
To understand the relationship between knowledge and trust on the Web, it is necessary to apprehend the concepts of knowledge and trust in the first place. On both topics, much has been said within the realm of philosophy: while questions around knowledge have their own branch in philosophy-epistemology, the concept of trust has been discussed in different philosophical domains: in moral philosophy, in political philosophy, as well as in philosophy of science and epistemology. Therefore, I start by outlining my theoretical foundations, i.e. the concepts of knowledge and trust, which I consider adequate and fruitful for apprehending the dynamics of epistemic practices on the Web.
Theoretical foundations
I conceive both the Web and science as socio-technical epistemic systems. Although they may differ with many respects (cf. Wray 2009), in both domains, the Web and science, a multitude of epistemic agents interact with each other, with a technical infrastructure and with their objects of inquiry to produce epistemic content. This does not imply that the sole purpose of the Web is epistemic or that epistemic agents on the Web always produce epistemic content, let alone knowledge. However, due to this very fundamental similarity, insights from science may well be used to approach epistemic practices on the Web. Therefore, it seems appropriate to adopt Helen Longino's Critical Contextual Empiricism as the epistemological basis of my analyses and to use Hardwig's observations on the role of trust in science to elucidate the relationship between knowledge and trust. Knowledge I consider Helen Longino's Critical Contextual Empiricism as developed in her book ''The Fate of Knowledge'' (Longino 2002) to deliver an appropriate epistemological framework for understanding epistemic practices on the Web although it is developed in the context of science. In particular I use her definition of knowledge as epistemically acceptable content, her notion of conformation as well as her three modalities of knowledge as the epistemological basis for my analyses.
Longino argues that many misunderstandings concerning knowledge are a result of the fact that the word ''knowledge'' is used to describe quite different things and therefore provides a tripartite classification of knowledge into knowledge as content, knowledge as cognitive agency and knowledge as knowledge-productive practices. Knowledgeproductive practices describe the processes involved in transforming various inputs into representational, epistemic outputs. Knowledge as cognitive agency describes the threeterm relation between a subject, an object and a representation. Knowledge as content finally refers to the body of knowledge, to what is known in its materialized form. ''Socializing'' the three modalities of knowledge makes Longino conclude that knowledge-productive practices and their modes of justification vary in different contexts; cognitive agents are interdependent and situated; and knowledge as content is plural and depends upon effective transformative criticism by differently situated epistemic agents who nonetheless share epistemic standards (Longino 2002: 122) .
With Longino I conceive knowledge to be a social status that can be ascribed to epistemic content by a community. ''Knowledge'' in this sense is a success term labelling epistemic content that has survived critical scrutiny from multiple agents and satisfies communal standards. She defines knowledge as content as follows:
''A given content, A, accepted by members of C counts as knowledge for C if A conforms to its intended object(s) (sufficiently to enable members of C to carry out their projects with respect to that/those object(s) and A is epistemically acceptable 4 in C'' (Longino 2002: 135 ).
Longino's notion of conformation is adopted to describe the relationship between epistemic content and the object it refers to. She conceives conformation as an umbrella term for the empirical success of content. Notions of truth, isomorphism, homomorphism, fit, similarity or approximation are just special instantiations of it. Conformation can be applied to non-propositional content, it depends on the purpose of an epistemic task and as compared to the true-false-dichotomy, it comes in degrees. To exemplify conformation, Longino compares scientific theories with maps, because both are made for certain purposes and might serve these purposes better or worse. Of course, in order to be useful, maps have to be empirically adequate, but maps are hardly true. What should the truth of a map be? Being a duplicate of the terrain they are intended to map? Quite to the contrary, it is a crucial characteristic of maps, that they do not just duplicate the terrain they are supposed to map. Doing this, they would be useless. In a similar vein, theories are not meant to just copy the reality they seek to explain and as such are never strictly speaking true, at least not in the sense of corresponding to reality. Comparing theories to maps also supports Longino's proposed plurality of knowledge and enables to understand the context-and purpose-dependence of quality assessment. Since there can be different maps of the same terrain that serve different purposes, there is not one true map of this terrain or even the best map. Rather, depending on my interest, a geographic or a political map of Germany may be better suited. As long as all maps are empirically adequate, none of them is false, none of them even is essentially better than the other. Only for and within each purpose can I compare the quality of these maps.
Adopting such an epistemological perspective has consequences for the analysis of epistemic practices on the Web understood as a socio-technical epistemic system consisting of situated and interdependent epistemic agents that engage in knowledge-productive practices by interacting with one another, with their objects of inquiry and the technological infrastructure connecting them. To reach their epistemic goals, agents make use of existing 4 Epistemic acceptability in turn is defined as follows: ''Some content A is epistemically acceptable in community C at time t if A is or is supported by data d evident to C at t in light of reasoning and background assumptions which have survived critical scrutiny from as many perspectives as are available to C at t, and C is characterized by venues for criticism, uptake of criticism, public standards, and tempered equality of intellectual authority'' (Longino 2002: 135). epistemic content, ideally successful epistemic content, i.e. knowledge as content that has survived critical scrutiny. They use this content as input for knowledge-productive practices through which new epistemic content is produced that can then be subjected to public scrutiny and may end up being considered knowledge if this status is ascribed to it by a community.
All these epistemic practices, these interactions in sociotechnical epistemic systems are based on trust: trust in other epistemic agents, trust in epistemic content that is used as input, trust in artefacts, and trust in epistemic processes themselves. Trust is a fundamental ingredient of such epistemic processes, without trust there can be no knowledge.
Trust
In recent years, the topic of trust has received substantial attention within and beyond philosophy. Trust has been addressed in ethics (e.g. Baier 1986; Holton 1994; Jones 1996) , in epistemology (Hardwig 1985; Hardwig 1991) , as well as in historical (Shapin 1994 ) and philosophical accounts of science (Kitcher 1993) . Within epistemology, the topic of trust is often embedded in the discourse around testimony. Testimony, considered the fourth classical route to knowledge-in addition to perception, inference and memory-refers to the process of acquiring knowledge through the words of others and its relevance cannot be underrated.
A central debate in contemporary epistemological accounts of testimony concerns the question of whether testimony is a basic source of knowledge with the same status as perception, memory or inference or whether its status is lower thereby requiring justification from more fundamental sources of knowledge. The two poles of argumentation are reductionism and anti-reductionism. Fricker summarizes the reductionist position by stating that ''[r]eductionists about testimony hold that, if testimony is to be vindicated as a source not merely of belief, but of knowledge, our epistemic right to believe what others tell us must be exhibitable as grounded in other epistemic resources and principles-perception, memory and inference-which are regarded by them as both more fundamental, and less problematic'' (Fricker 1995: 394) . This reductionist position is often traced back to David Hume's discussion On Miracles (Hume 1748 (Hume /1957 . The contrasting anti-reductionist position, which treats trust in testimony as intrinsically justified is often traced back to Thomas Reid's principle of credulity, according to which we have […] ''a disposition to confide in the veracity of others, and to believe what they tell us[…]'', because God intended us to be ''social creatures'' (Reid 1983 : 94f, quoted by Adler 2006 . Recently, there have been several accounts of testimony that seem to propose a ''third way'' by arguing that while human knowledge is impossible without trust in the words of others, this does not deliver an a priori justification of trust in others and that the warrant of trust depends on the actual epistemic situation (e.g. Fricker 2006 , cf. also Sperber and Clément to appear). I consider such accounts to be more adequate and useful to understand actual testimonial practices. In particular, I adopt Origgi's contextualist approach towards an epistemology of testimony which she develops with reference to the pragmatics of communication. According to her, ''the way we gain knowledge through communication is influenced by the responsibility we take in granting authority to a source of information'' (Origgi 2008: 36) . In such communicative processes targeted at the acquisition of knowledge, our epistemic standards, our epistemic vigilance differs depending on what is at stake (Sperber and Clément to appear).
However, adopting a position on trust that is based on testimonial communication of epistemic content is not sufficient to understand trust in socio-technical epistemic systems. In such systems, we do not only place trust in human epistemic agents, but also in non-human agents, in epistemic processes as well as in epistemic content itself. Yet, most accounts on trust in philosophy focus on trust in other persons only (cf. Mcleod 2006) and many debates can only be understood with reference to trust in humans.
For instance, a central characteristic of trust for Annette Baier and a criterion by which trust can be distinguished from mere reliance concerns the assumed good will of the trustee. According to Baier, trust differs from reliance, because if we are let down we feel betrayed and not just disappointed. Holton (Holton 1994) re-interprets the differentiation between feeling betrayed versus feeling disappointed with reference to Strawson's notions of reactive and participant attitudes (Strawson 1974) . Holton argues that betrayal is a reactive attitude which we usually only take towards people: if people whom we trusted let us down, we feel resentful, if a machine breaks down, we rather feel angry. Underlying this different reaction is a general participant attitude (Strawson 1974 ), a participant stance (Holton 1994) towards the other person, a stance which we do not adopt towards unanimated objects.
For those accounts that aim at understanding trust relationships between humans, one may distinguish trust from reliance by making use of this criterion. However, once we want to analyze epistemic practices in which not only humans, but also technologies such as algorithms are involved, the notion of trust would become a useless concept if it can by definition not be applied to non-human agents. Hence, I use trust as an umbrella term that covers both reliance and trust for the following reason: if misplaced, trust results in feelings of disappointment. It can result in feelings of betrayal, if I ascribe intentionality to an epistemic agents, if I consider him to have me let down on purpose. We usually do not ascribe intentionality to unanimated objects, which is why we do not feel betrayed by them. However, even with respect to human epistemic agents, the ascription of intentionality is crucial for the feeling of betrayal. I feel betrayed if the trustee turns out to be dishonest but not if he turns out to be incompetent. It is important to note that whether I feel betrayed or disappointed resides in my perception of the reasons for failure. Irrespective of whether the reason why someone has let me down lies in his incompetence or his dishonesty, my affective reaction depends on my perception of this reason.
To conclude, a broader notion of trust in used to analyze trust in socio-technical epistemic systems. Trust in such systems can be placed in human as well as non-human agents, in processes as well as in epistemic content itself. The commonality is that in each case my trust involves the risk of being let down, but it does not imply that I need to feel betrayed.
Since not only the Web, but also science can be conceived as a socio-technical epistemic system, accounts on trust in science seem well suited to understand the processes of trusting to know on the Web which encompass not only trust in human epistemic agents, but also trust in non-human, non-animated epistemic agents. John Hardwig's account is particularly useful (Hardwig 1991; Hardwig 1985) . By emphasizing the fundamental role of trust for knowledge, Hardwig acknowledges that trust cannot only be placed in people, but also in processes and in knowledge itself. Moreover, Hardwig links epistemology to ethics by showing that in order to successfully operate in science scientists need to assess their peers morally and epistemologically.
His analysis departs from the observation that the majority of research is nowadays conducted in teams and he presents examples of major scientific achievements in physics and mathematics as case studies in support of his claims (Hardwig 1991) . Cooperation in science is needed to overcome time restrictions on the one hand and to handle the rising specialization in science on the other. Due to this high specialization, scientists do not only lack the time to perform every subtask of their research on their own, but mostly they also lack the necessary expertise in the respective area of research. Hence, in scientific co-operations scientists have to trust the competency of their colleagues as well as their honesty. This implies that they have to assess their colleagues not only epistemically but also morally.
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Trust is epistemologically even more fundamental than evidence such as empirical data or logical argumentation, because one needs to trust these pieces of evidence and their providers to actually use them at all. Thus, assessing the trustworthiness of members of epistemic communities is fundamental to all scientific endeavors and represents the groundwork of (scientific) knowledge creation. Yet which criteria do we have to assess trustworthy agents?
One rule of a thumb to decide upon the honesty is provided by Steven Shapin in his book ''A Social History of Truth'' (Shapin 1994) . While analyzing the development of English experimental philosophy as a predecessor of experimental science, Shapin argues that a good strategy to find someone who is unlikely to lie is to find someone who is disinterested and free. In Seventeenth-century England, those who were considered to be free were the gentlemen, because their economic position allowed them not to work. Economic freedom was considered to be a prerequisite for moral freedom. According to Shapin, it was assumed that ''[g]entlemen were truth-tellers because nothing could work upon them that would induce them to be otherwise'' (Shapin 1994: 84) . He argues that ''[…] it was the disinterestedness of the English gentleman's situation that was most importantly identified as the basis of his truth-telling'' (Shapin 1994: 83) .
The question of competence, by contrast, has less to do with interest, but with ability. In fields where we are knowledgeable it may be easy to evaluate the competence of others, because we can assess it directly. However, problems occur when we enter unfamiliar realms. These are exactly the fields, where we have to rely on others even more strongly. Here we cannot assess their expertise even if we were willing to invest the time to double-check all their claims, because we lack the knowledge to evaluate their competence in the first place. 6 As noted before, we do rely on others all the time. Mostly we do this by relying on proxies, indicators of their competence. These proxies may include the quantity of articles someone has published, the journals in which they are published, her institutional 5 Hardwig (1991) introduces a third criterion to assess someone's trustworthiness: adequate epistemic self-assessment, i.e. the ability to assess one's own level of competence regarding the issue at hand.
Footnote 5 continued Since adequate epistemic self-assessment is a second-order competence, which indicates the limits of one's competence, I subsume it under my considerations on the assessment of competence. 6 Some authors have argued that there is no need for epistemic trust, because there are strategies by which a novice can assess and compare experts based on evidence. Such strategies include the evidence on the track records of the experts or asking further experts either for their opinion on the topic matter or on the expert at stake (Goldman 2001) . Despite certain problems (cf. Coady 2006), such strategies are clearly possible and often useful. However, they are themselves based on trust-on trust in other people or trust in evidence, which is provided by someone. Thus, they do not offer an alternative to the view in which knowledge and trust are inherently entangled, but only possible strategies to make trust more rational by basing it on some knowledge.
The entanglement of trust and knowledge on the Web 347 background, her academic status, the authors H-index, her reputation more broadly conceived, etc. Yet proxies are just this: approximations and heuristics and as such they are fallible.
Trust and knowledge on the Web
As my initial self-observation has shown, trusting to know is also crucial on the Web. The Web is an enormous conglomeration of epistemic content of varying quality. If we pursue epistemic goals, it is therefore crucial to extract valuable content from the overabundance of existing content. In many cases we have to trust, because we cannot check everything for ourselves. In the following I want to present two tools that are used for epistemic purposes on the Web: Wikipedia and Recommender Systems.
Wikipedia
Wikipedia is one of the greatest success stories of the Web. An army of volunteers has provided a source of epistemic content that millions of people trust and use regularly in order to know. Taking a look at its self-description reveals its magnitude and main characteristics.
''Wikipedia is a multilingual, Web-based, free-content encyclopedia project based mostly on anonymous contributions.
[…] Wikipedia is written collaboratively by an international group of volunteers. Anyone with internet access can write and make changes to Wikipedia articles. There are no requirements to provide one's real name when contributing […] . Since its creation in 2001, Wikipedia has grown rapidly into one of the largest reference web sites, attracting around 65 million visitors monthly as of 2009. There are more than 85,000 active contributors working on more than 14,000,000 articles in more than 260 languages''.
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If there is one conclusion to be drawn it is that many people use Wikipedia for epistemic purposes. Yet can you trust Wikipedia? And if so for which reasons? Different answers have been given to these questions (Magnus 2009; Tollefsen 2009; Wray 2009 ) and some of Wikipedia's critics keep insisting that one should not trust it at all (Waters 2007; Keen 2008) . Indeed, many of the proxies that we usually use to assess the trustworthiness of information are missing: due to its openness, people can edit who would not be considered experts on the topic. And due to the anonymity of contributions we can neither assess the competency nor the honesty of contributors. The reason for trusting Wikipedia must thus be different from trusting a person. I argue that the reason why people trust the content of Wikipedia is that they trust the processes of Wikipedia. It is a form of procedural trust, not a trust in persons. Shirky's concept of algorithmic authority may help to clarify this difference. Shirky introduces this concept to indicate a new form of trust on the Web: trust in aggregators and filters (Shirky 2009 ). According to him, the dual function of referring to authority in general lies in ''increasing the likelihood of being right, and of reducing the penalty for being wrong'' (Shirky 2009) . Algorithmic authority as a new mode of authority differs from traditional forms of trust, such as personal or institutional trust. It refers to the ''decision to regard as authoritative an unmanaged process of extracting value from diverse, untrustworthy sources, without any human standing beside the result saying 'Trust this because you trust me''' (Shirky 2009) . He describes the formation of algorithmic authority as follows (Shirky 2009 ): First, material from multiple sources, which themselves are not vetted for their trustworthiness, has to be combined in a process that is not supervised by some editor before being made available. Second, this mode of providing information must lead to good results so that people start to trust it. Yet, only once people realize that others trust this source as well, it turns into an authoritative source of information for this community of people. Epistemic authority is shared epistemic trust. Please note that this is a descriptive statement. I do not argue that this trust is well-placed or that the attribution of epistemic authority is warranted. The normative appropriateness yet has to be assessed.
If people know how Wikipedia works and trust it, then they trust it, because they attribute some epistemic authority, some trustworthiness to the process by which Wikipedia generates epistemic content. They do not trust specific persons; they trust Wikipedia as a system that is based on a distinct process of content creation. This process is characterized by a multitude of users that can edit and change content immediately combined with a mechanism to undo revisions easily and quickly as well as a system for tracking these changes and making them visible. It is a system enforcing open access with minimal entry barriers combined with mechanism of making editing patterns transparent.
The rationale behind this openness of Wikipedia is scale. More people can provide more epistemic content faster. However, a second point is crucial: the more people scrutinize and can easily change content, the less likely it is that error and bias remains undetected. Please note, that there is no guarantee that error or bias gets detected. It is only more likely if a multitude of diverse people participate in this process. This is a probabilistic statement. Wikipedia provides a lot of content on many topics due to the multitude of volunteers. But if Wikipedia had not provided good 8 content it would not be used to the extent it is used. On average, Wikipedia works well as a source of information. However, the problem lies exactly in the term on average. Since Wikipedia is a dynamic system, content can be changed by anyone anytime. Hence, there is no guarantee that the content provided at the moment one accesses Wikipedia is correct or a blatant lie. While Wikipedia might be trusted as a system because of certain characteristics, this overall trustworthiness does not help us to assess the trustworthiness of a specific claim in Wikipedia. This is the crux of statistical reasoning: it works well on average, but we can never be certain about a specific instantiation. To improve this assessment of specific claims, various tools have been developed to empower users to make more informed decisions about which claims to trust and where to be skeptical. In the following I depict two of them briefly, the WikiScanner and the WikiDashboard. I argue that while both of them empower users to assess the trustworthiness of epistemic content, they function very differently-and require different forms of trust themselves. I conclude this section with sketching yet another example of a tool that can empower users and make them more careful and responsible knowers: traffic lights of trustworthiness.
WikiScanner: which ip-address does not belong to a gentleman?
In 2007, a tool called WikiScanner 9 has received quite a lot of attention and media coverage. WikiScanner is a search tool that traces IP addresses of those who change Wikipedia entries anonymously. The tool was developed by Virgil Griffith, a graduate student at CalTech. Griffith says that the inspiration for this tool has been the revelation that the offices of Congress members had been editing their own Wikipedia entries (Borland 2007) . He wanted to find out whether other companies and organizations also edit entries in ways that served their interests. And indeed, by tracking the IP addresses of anonymous editors, this tool unveiled that numerous organizations were editing Wikipedia articles anonymously in a way that served their particular interests. On his website, Griffith concludes: ''Overall-especially for non-controversial topics-Wikipedia seems to work. For controversial topics, Wikipedia can be made more reliable through techniques like this one. '' 10 What is the epistemic and ethical utility of a tool like WikiScanner? Referring back to the insights obtained from Shapin one may argue that WikiScanner helps to find out which IP-addresses do not belong to gentlemen (Shapin 1994) . Disinterestedness is an important proxy for honesty. And the flipside of the coin is that if we can reasonably assume bias because those who edited an entry do have an interest in it, we should re-assess the amount of trust we place in this particular entry accordingly.
WikiDashboard: using editing patterns to assess trustworthiness
WikiDashboard is another tool which aims at raising the trustworthiness of Wikipedia by making things transparent, but the rationale is quite different. Instead of revealing the identity of anonymous contributors, WikiDashboard '' […] visualizes the social dynamics and editing patterns of every article and editor of Wikipedia'' . The basic idea behind the development of this tool was that the fact that anyone can edit any Wikipedia article is not necessarily a threat to reliability. Although WikiScanner has revealed that people sometimes consciously and purposefully introduce error into Wikipedia and by doing this exploit Wikipedia's openness, the same openness can also be a source for its reliability. Using science as a point of reference, Suh et al. argue that it is precisely the possibility to put ideas into discussion, to examine and challenge each other's claims, that is crucial for knowledge generation in science and that similar processes also occur on the Web . Reliability and growth of knowledge might thus be advanced by discussions and mutual criticism in combination with practices that increase social transparency, such as attribution, indication of past performance and provision of sources.
WikiDashboards exist for users and for articles (Figs. 1,  2) . Thus the editing activity of a specific user or a specific article is visualized and can be used as a cue for assessing the trustworthiness of an article at a given moment or as a proxy for the trustworthiness of a user. The WikiDashboard embedded within each article of Wikipedia is intended to make the user aware of interesting editing patterns, he or she might otherwise not notice. In the case of articles examples would be sudden bursts of editorial activity due to recent events. WikiDashboards on user sites might indicate the user's specific editing habits as well as the range and variety of topics she has contributed to. Such editing patterns could thus be used as proxies to assess the users' trustworthiness. If he has edited many pages with similar content, this may be a proxy for his competence on 8 As noted before, I assume a position according to which quality assessment always depends on the epistemic purpose and the standards vary depending what is at stakes. The entanglement of trust and knowledge on the Web 349 the topic. If his editing patterns reveal frequent repetitive revisions, he may have been involved in flame wars, which in turn may be a sign of his dishonesty. To conclude, by unveiling the evolvement of articles and the role and amount of conflict therein, WikiDahsboard aims at raising the social transparency and accountability of Wikipedia. More specifically, the overall trustworthiness of Wikipedia is supposed to be raised by an increase of transparency on the level of individual articles and users. Thus, WikiDashboard may decrease the trust of users in an article by revealing an editing pattern that is indicative of a flame war and therefore warns the user not to trust the information provided. By doing this, WikiDashboard empowers the user in giving him reasons to distrust. And the existence of such a tool increases the overall trustworthiness of Wikipedia, because it amends the information with an indicator of its trustworthiness. To use a statistical comparison: it is as if Wikipedia would not only deliver a measure, but also the confidence interval.
However, an important problem with WikiDashboard concerns the interpretation of these visualized editing patterns: to what extent are they useful to assess the trustworthiness of users and pages? After all, the user involved in the flame war may just as well be the one who introduces error as the one who devotes time to correct it.
The editing pattern alone may not be able to tell the difference. Therefore editing patterns can only be used as one proxy amongst others and their merits yet have to be assessed empirically. The second problem concerns the accessibility of WikiDashboard. The interface of WikiDashboard it quite complex and some users may refrain from using it, because they do not understand it. This leads us to the relationship between simplicity and complexity in making things transparent.
Transparency, simplicity and traffic lights of trustworthiness
In the case of WikiScanner and WikiDashboard transparency is used to support critical assessment and attribution of trustworthiness. Rendering the sources and editing patterns visible enables rational assessment of content provided on Wikipedia. However, transparency is often a matter of degree and how transparent something is depends on someone's abilities. The question therefore is: what is how transparent for whom?
For instance, the discussion and history pages of Wikipedia, which serve as input data for Chi et al.'s tool ) are in principle already accessible to all users of Wikipedia. However, many people do not look at these : 28.11.2009] pages. Maybe because it is too much effort; maybe because they do not want to be bothered; maybe because they do not understand the interface or how information about revisions might be useful to assess the quality of content. It is especially for this very last fraction of users that WikiDashboard might be interesting. However, even some of those from the 'I don't care'-category might be turned into 'Well, now-I'm-interested', if the indication of trustworthiness is a salient feature of the website and if it proves useful to them in their first trials.
WikiDashboard is not simply another Web2.0 widget, but a tool for empowerment, a tool that raises awareness about the functioning-and possible malfunctioning-of one of the major information sources on the Web. However, I also think that its interface is quite complex and difficult to interpret. Users may still feel overwhelmed by the huge amount of data provided even in this aggregated format and therefore they might not use it. An interesting question therefore is whether there might be even simpler tools that still raise the epistemological and ethical reflexivity of many differently skilled and interested users.
Let's assume we have an algorithm that translates the editing patterns into the three different signals of a traffic light: Depending on the editing patters, the traffic light embedded on top of each Wikipedia site would be in red, yellow or green. Wouldn't this make you stop and wonder for a second what this signal is trying to tell you? Whether you should treat the entry differently depending on whether the lights are on red or green? The traffic lights are simply a much more condensed and intuitive format than the rather complex interface of the WikiDashboard. The traffic light signal would be a dynamic, automatically generated indicator of the controversies which preceded the temporal fixation of the Wikipedia article the moment you read it. This indicator can then be used as a proxy for the trustworthiness of the current state of the article. That this indicator is dynamic and automatically generated based on the editing patterns is crucial for assessing the trustworthiness of any dynamic website. If the traffic lights cannot potentially change with each revision of the article, they would soon be rendered unreliable and thus useless as indicators of trustworthiness of a potentially constantly changing article. Yet this is exactly what users are interested in: a quick assessment of the quality of the article they see at the moment they see it.
However, simplicity comes with a price. If we use the traffic lights as proxies to assess the trustworthiness of information provided on Wikipedia, we only shift the locus of trust: Instead of trusting the content on Wikipedia, we now have to trust the mechanism assessing its trustworthiness. That is, instead of trusting the mechanism by which information is created on Wikipedia, we now have to trust the algorithm that simplifies a multitude of complex editing patterns into a tripartite signal. Here, at the very latest, a complete shift from personal trust to algorithmic trust is achieved. And as we will see in the next section, decisions embedded into algorithms are even less subject to critical scrutiny than Wikipedia articles-because they are less visible. Yet once we realize the epistemological and ethical relevance of seemingly minor programming decisions, it becomes obvious that we have to maintain and possibly even increase a critical stance when delegating the assessment of trustworthiness to algorithms. Moreover, it becomes obvious that on the Web different forms of trust in human and non-human epistemic agents are used interchangeably. This implies that although this shift poses new questions for an epistemological analysis and new challenges for responsible knowers, differentiating between trust and reliance does not appear to make much sense in socio-technical epistemic systems. (Massa and Bhattacharjee 2004) . When a new user enters a system, the system does not ''know'' anything about this new user and this ignorance makes it difficult to generate appropriate recommendations for her. To counteract this problem, traditionally, new users have been asked to rate a few items so that the system can ''learn'' something about the user in order to provide personalized information on interesting items for her. However, especially in large databases necessary correlations are scarce and thus, this procedure often turns out to be quite ineffective. In consequence, Massa and Bhattachasjee have developed an algorithm for ''Trust-aware Recommender Systems'', arguing that this problem can be solved by implementing a notion of trust between users into the system (Massa and Bhattacharjee 2004) . The difference between traditional RSs and trust-aware RSs is quite simple: ''[w]hile traditional RSs exploit only ratings provided by users about items, Trust-aware Recommender Systems let the user express also trust statements, i.e. their subjective opinions about the usefulness of other users'' (Massa and Avesani 2006) . This seemingly minor change proves to be highly effective to remedy the cold start problem because ''it is able to exploit trust propagation over the trust network by means of a trust metric'' (Massa and Avesani 2006) .
With respect to the relationship between knowledge and trust this example implies that using trust in persons within RS is epistemically useful because it enables better predictions. However, a second point is interesting and it concerns our trust in the algorithms themselves. As Shirky has noted, there seems to be an increasing willingness to attribute epistemic authority to algorithms (Shirky 2009 ). Unfortunately, we often trust these algorithms blindly. Algorithms are hidden within a system. In most cases we are not aware how they work and we cannot assess their impact on the information we receive. In other words: algorithms are black-boxed. Once a system is released the way it works seems without alternatives-and the negotiations and decisions that have taken place in its development become invisible.
Yet, to get an idea of the relevance of such invisible decisions it is instructive to compare the effects different algorithms have when being applied to the same data set. As an example, I shall briefly compare two types of trust metrics: local and global trust metrics (Massa and Avesani 2007) . Trust metrics are techniques for answering questions such as ''Should I trust this person?'' in virtual communities. Hence they are means to estimate the trustworthiness of information providers. Depending on the metric, the algorithm you chose, you will receive different values of trustworthiness for each user. That means that even if a distinct value of a user existed (her ''true'' trustworthiness), the predictions of different metrics would be dispersed around this true value. This is a basic effect of using statistical methods for predictions. However, the problem may be even more profound. What if there is no such thing as a true value of trustworthiness of a user? What if the user A's trustworthiness was different for user B and user C? This is the rationale behind local trust metrics: while ''[g]lobal trust metrics assign to a given user a unique trust score, the same independently of the user that is evaluating the other user's trustworthiness […], a local trust metric provides a personalized trust score that depends on the point of view of the evaluating user'' (Massa and Avesani 2007: 40) .
From the perspective of local trust metrics, the trustworthiness of a user is not an intrinsic value of that user, but lies in the eyes of the beholder. Moreover, different algorithms have differential effects on users as becomes obvious for controversial users. Controversial users are users who are trusted and distrusted by many other users of the system. By using a global trust metric that calculates an average trust value for each user, these users would simply be ''averaged out''. They would be rendered irrelevant by receiving the weight ''zero''. It is of epistemological and ethical interest that controversial users are valued very differently in these two different metrics. Local trust metrics explicitly stress and appreciate the individuality and situatedness of every trust statement and state that controversial users by definition do not have a global trust value for the whole community. By contrast, global trust metrics suggest a fictitious consensus between users by calculating an averaged trust value for each user. Through this process, the controversial user is rendered ''unreliable'' and gets statistically eliminated.
These different types of trust metrics do not only have different underlying assumptions about the value of those users and about deviation from the mean-or norm-more generally. They also have an impact on which recommendations you receive and whose opinions are included. Averaging out controversial users by means of statistics has a similar effect as other mechanisms of sorting out (Bowker and Star 1999) and silencing: they exclude those from participation that deviate too much from the norms or do not fit in ready-made categories.
To conclude, local trust and global trust metric are based on very different premises: not only do they differ with respect to their stance towards universality versus situatedness of trustworthiness. They also value different user types differently and have differential effects on the importance of such users. However, trust in trust-based RSs is not only placed in other users, but also in the algorithms themselves. Hence, trust-based RSs as much as traditional RSs are another case of algorithmic authority, of attributing trust in non-human epistemic agents. Indeed, in the case of trust-based RSs, algorithms organize trust-relationships between users, i.e. they may induce personal trust. How then, can we be responsible knowers not only with respect to other users, but also with respect to our interaction with such algorithms?
Responsibility and empowerment through transparency: MyChoice
We have seen that different algorithms in trust-aware RSs lead to different recommendations and affect users of the system differently. Moreover, these processes are usually black-boxed and therefore not assessed critically. What if we made such algorithms visible? What if we left it up to the user to decide whether he prefers to use local or global trust metrics? All that would be needed to increase the transparency of RSs and to empower its users is a dual search-button and a way to visualize the differences between the different algorithms. In the following I sketch a simple, yet epistemologically and ethically relevant extension to trust-aware RSs. I label my thought experiment MyChoice for two reasons. First it is supposed to indicate that epistemologically and ethically relevant choices are constantly being made in the course of developing software. Thus, by the label MyChoice, users should be made aware that these decisions are built into software and have certain effects. Secondly, MyChoice is a tool that empowers users to make informed choices of their own where it is normally the programmer who has decided for them.
Basically, MyChoice has two distinct features (cf. Fig.  3 ). One is a dual search button, by which you can chose between two different trust metrics to generate recommendations. The labels that I have chosen are ''Search… personalized for me'' versus ''Search… the golden mean''. They correspond to the local and global trust metrics as described by Massa and Avesani (Massa and Avesani 2007) . One can set one of the trust metrics as one's default. However, by clicking on one of the two buttons one can change this for each new query. The second feature is an ''open-eye''-button. If you click on this button, the differences between the two trust metrics will be visualized.
As noted before, there are two differences: different recommendations and differential effects on the users of the system, who are given different weights. The different recommendations could be indicated simply by listing them next to each other. Users would see the recommendations based on global trust metrics on the right half of the page and those based on local trust metrics on the left. The differences would be visible at a glance. And by seeing two different lists of recommendations users would become aware of the effects algorithms have on the recommendation they obtain-effects that they were formerly not aware of, simply because they were not visible.
MyChoice would also empower users to decide which algorithm works better for them. The dual search button enables users to make more informed decisions about the information she wants to receive. I have argued before that quality assessment depends on the context and the purpose. Hence, it should be possible to switch between the global and the local metric depending on the context. Users might opt for the more situated, local option when looking for movie recommendations, but for the rather universalist, global one when they want to learn something basic about computing, statistics or gardening. In fields where users are more interested in mainstream recommendations, they might press the ''Golden Mean''-button. For other questions, they might prefer the ''Personalized For Me''-search. In the end this decision is up to the user. But simply by using MyChoice, users will learn about the functioning and the consequences of different metrics and algorithms and this can have positive epistemological and ethical consequences by making them more responsible and reflective knowers.
As was shown in the case of the controversial user, different algorithms also value users differently. To make these differential effects of local and global trust metrics on users visible, one might use social network graphics. One could again place two social network graphics next to each other and indicate the different weights of users by different color codes. Depending on the algorithm, the color of users may change, indicating a differential treatment by the two algorithms. Highlighting those groups of users who are most affected by changes in trust metrics would render the discriminative consequences of different metrics visible. Moreover, this information about different users and user types might not only be illuminative for the users, but also for developers trying to improve their metrics and algorithms.
What would be the utility of a tool such as MyChoice? First of all, such a system empowers the user, because it offers her the chance to decide upon which algorithms she prefers for different purposes. Moreover, people using this system would become much more aware of how implicit assumptions and values of programmers are inscribed into technology. Users would realize the impact of certain programming decisions on the retrieval of information and on different user groups. This effect would already be triggered by the dual search option, but it would be amended by the visualization.
Conclusions
In this paper, I argue for the entanglement of knowledge and trust and emphasize the need for transparency in sociotechnical epistemic system. I characterize the Web as an epistemic environment in which we trust certain epistemic content by using it as input for knowledge-producing practices. In order to know we have to put some trust in content, we can never be certain about all the premises we use in our knowledge-producing practices. If we cannot trust knowledge produced by others, we are condemned to go around in circles and keep reinventing the wheel. However, since trust is not certainty, it involves the risk of being let down. As responsible knowers, we have to be aware of this risk. We may have a default to trust, but also a duty to watch out for signs of dishonesty and incompetence.
This risk of misplacing trust exists on the Web as much as elsewhere. A specificity of the Web, however, concerns the proliferation of a new form of trust: trust in algorithms.
In the examples I provide, different algorithms are used for various epistemic purposes. They are used to provide new informational input as well as to assess the trustworthiness of information and its providers. The crucial twist is that they also have to be made subject to scrutiny themselves. To be responsible knowers we must not only be willing to assess whether we are warranted in trusting epistemic content and its providers. We must also make our methods for assessing trustworthiness subject to scrutiny.
However, the users are not the only ones who are responsible for their ways of trusting and knowing. Those who design systems are also to be held accountable. The development of tools that empower users by making functions transparent and providing choices should be an epistemological and ethical goal for designers. Indeed, the extent to which tools enable users to modulate the amount of trust they can put in content should serve as an additional criteria for judging the quality of Web tools.
